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The First Amendment: Has the Supreme
Court Overlooked its Role as Guardian of
our Freedom by Failing to Distinguish
Between Real Threat and Mere Shadow?

by Jimmy Daniels*
I.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
"1

This single phrase, referred to as the Establishment Clause, has
created much confusion among legal scholars throughout the latter part
* Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., 1995); Florida State
University (B.S., 1991). To my wife, Stacy: Despite an understandable disregard for legal
analysis you affectionately displayed an interest in my work and, without your
encouragement, I would have undoubtedly failed. For that, I thank you. Along the same
lines, I am compelled to thank my mom and dad because, without them, I would have
neither the ability nor the interest to write this article. Similarly, there are two professors
at Mercer Law School, who, because of their mastery at the art of teaching, equipped me
with, the tools and inspiration necessary to complete this project. Thank you for the
guidance Doctor Ledwon, and thank you, Professor Cole, for the mind transformation.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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of the Twentieth Century and particularly the past two decades. This
confusion, in my opinion, can be attributed to historical ignorance,
misapplication, or both.
II. THE HISTORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA
"A page of history is worth a volume of logic."2 This is particularly
true in Establishment Clause cases,' in light of the fact, as expressed
by Justice Black, that "[tlhe history of man is inseparable from the
history of religion."4
Religious Custom
By uncovering realities, history exposes the truth and raises such
questions as why, traditionally, is the history of our Country replete
with religious references to a divine being.'e Indeed, the pervasiveness
of religion in our society is evident from such examples as our national
motto "In God We Trust" and our pledge of allegiance to a "nation under
God."' Yet, there are those who insist that any alliance between
government and religion, including our Country's heritage of pledging
allegiance and trust in a Supreme Being, runs counter to the Establishment Clause. If true, then why is it not a violation of the Establishment
Clause, for example, to have the Declaration of Independence placed on
our national walls, where it appeals to "'the Supreme Judge of the World
for the Rectitude of our Intentions' avowing 'a firm Reliance on the
Protection of divine Providence . .'"? On the other hand, how could
this magnificent document that marked the birth of our Country and
signified the freedom of our people be considered unconstitutional?
Herein lies the dilemma.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Marsh v. Chambers,'
attempted to reconcile the dilemma. The Chief Justice, in upholding the
practice of opening legislative sessions with an invocation, stated, "[iun

A

2. 112 S. Ct. at 2664 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (quoting Holmes, J.)).
3. Id.
4. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962).
5. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) ("Our history is replete with official
references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders.").
6. rd. at 676.
7. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2679 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
8. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Marsh, a Nebraska legislator and taxpayer brought an
action challenging the constitutionality of opening legislative sessions with an invocation
given by an ordained minister paid with the public funds. Id. at 784-85.
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light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years,
there can be no doubt that [this tradition] has become part of the fabric
of our society."' That invoking such "Divine guidance ... in these
circumstances ... is simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs
widely held among the people of this country."1
B. Civil Religion
History demonstrates that our Founding Fathers considered legislative
prayer to be a nonproselytizing activity." This practice, like our pledge
of allegiance to a "nation under God," is said to "harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions."12 This common integration of religion
acknowledged by our Founding Fathers1" and adopted by the Court is
referred to as civil religion.4

9. Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
10. Id. (emphasis added). In noting that "our history is pervaded by expressions of
religious beliefs," Chief Justice Burger, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,677 (1984), took
this tolerable acknowledgement exception one step further by upholding a government
sponsored depiction of a Nativity scene. Id. at 687. The Chief Justice reconciled his
holding in Lynch by pointing to the government's acknowledgement of public religion in the
context of, for example, such long-standing traditions as the opening of court sessions with
"God save the United States and this honorable court." Id. The Nativity scene had been,
for more than forty years, part of the city's annual display which included a Santa Claus
house, Christmas tree, and banner that read "Seasons Greetings." Id.
11. Id. at 788 (citing J. of the Sen. 88; J. of the H.R. 121). The Court, in evaluating the
impressions of our Founding Fathers, noted that the First Congress, just three days after
approving the appointment of paid chaplains, reached a final agreement as to the language
of the Establishment Clause. Id. This strongly suggests that the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer does not establish a particular religion.
12. Id. at 792 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
13. 465 U.S. at 675 (quoting A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 87 (rev. 1st ed. 1964)) (emphasis added). This becomes evident upon
review of the First Congress. One day after proposing the First Amendment, Congress
urged President Washington to proclaim "a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be
observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts, the many signal favours ofAlmighty God."
Id. On November 26, '1789, President Washington proclaimed a day of thanksgiving to
"offer[] our prayers and supplications to the Great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and beseech
Him to pardon our national and other transgressions ..... Id.
14. Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1249
(1986) (quoting West, A Proposed Neutral Definition of Civil Religion, 22 J. OF CHURCH &
STATE 23, 39 (1980)). Civil religion, sometimes referred to as public religion or civic
religion, is defined as "a set of beliefs and attitudes that explain the meaning and purpose
of any given ... society in terms of its relationship to a transcendent, spiritual reality, that
are held by the people generally of that society, and that are expressed in public rituals,
myths and symbols." Id.
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The doctrine of civil religion derives its power from the language of
varying religions. 5 This societal phenomenon has worked its way into
our lives through our desire and need for unity.16 As a result of
modem-day development, "7 this need for unity intensified, "forcing [our
society] to come up with new means of attaining and expressing social
cohesiveness.""
Thus, the rejoicing of a day for Thanksgiving and the embracing of
such documents as the Declaration of Independence "are not just the
remnants of some pre-constitutional Christianity; they are the constituent parts of a long-term response [to modem day development and the
subsequent disunification of our society]." 9 Moreover, these traditions,
while maintaining religious significance, are civil in nature, and do not,
therefore, endorse a particular faith.2' For that reason, civil religion
is well established in law and firmly embraced by the people; "a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."2'
III. PRESENT-DAY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Consider, in light of the doctrine of civil religion, the following case of
Adler v. Duval County School Board." Ask yourself whether the
Court's acknowledgement of civil religion should apply in the context of
high school commencement exercises.

15. Id. at 1249-50. Civil religion, by its very definition, is non-sectarian in nature,
neither espousing nor establishing a particular religion.
16. Id.
17. Id. The types of development which have contributed to this modern-day
separateness include the industrial movement and the subsequent increase in capital and
growth of populations; the creation of new and varying social organizations and special
interest groups; and the disestablishment of church which led to the categorization and
subsequent fragmentation of religion, government, society, and science.
18. Id. Society, subsequently, created this idea of civil religion, subconsciously or not,
in order to regain the unity that once was and is now lost.
19. Id. at 1253.
20. Id. at 1246 (quoting F. Wallace, cited in J. WILSON, PUBLIC RELIGION iN AMERICAN
CULTURE 166 (1979)).
[Civil] religion is not an unconstitutional establishment but rather a recognition
by the government that the majority of this country's inhabitants adhere to [a
number of] religious beliefs. Thus the organs of the state are not in any way
creating or establishing a religion, they are simply fashioning shared enactments
out of "particles of ritual" supplied by the people themselves.
Id.
21. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
22. 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
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A

FactualBackground
Shortly following the closing of the 1992 school year, Vicki Reynolds,
the legal liaison for the Duval County School Board, under the direction
of Superintendent Larry Zenke, issued 'a memorandum regarding
graduation prayer to all high school principals.' The memorandum
stated, "due to the recent Supreme Court ruling in Lee v. Weisman,'
there should be no prayer, benediction, or invocation at any graduation
ceremonies.
After receiving a number of letters which suggested that student-initiated and student-led prayer at graduation may be constitutional,
Superintendent Zenke directed Ms. Reynolds to further research the
issue.2 Ms. Reynolds concluded that student-initiated and student-led
prayer at graduation may be appropriate so long as the School Board
was not involved in the decision making process.2" Superintendent
Zenke, thereafter, issued a second memorandum. The memorandum
provided, in part, that a brief graduation message, if so chosen, was to
be prepared and delivered by a student volunteer, elected by the
graduating class as a whole, without the assistance or direction of the
school board or its employees.'

23. Id. at 448.
24. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). The Court in Lee held that the Establishment Clause is
violated where a school principal, acting pursuant to state policy, invites a rabbi to deliver
an invocation at a middle school graduation ceremony.
25. 851 F. Supp. at 448.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 449.
28. Id. The memorandum, in its entirety, states:
You will recall that after the 1992 Supreme court case of Lee v. [Weisman], you
received a memorandum from me instructing that because of the decision, we
would no longer be able to have prayers at graduation ceremonies. Most of you
have recently been bombarded with information, as have I, regarding whether or
not student initiated and led prayers are acceptable based upon a recent Fifth
Circuit opinion. The purpose of this memorandum is to give you some guidelines
on this issue if the graduating students at your school desire to have some type
of brief opening and/or closing message by a student.
This area of the law is far from clear at this time, and we have been threatened
by lawsuits from both sides on the issue depending on what action we take. The
key to the Lee v. [Weisman] decision was that prayer given at that graduation
ceremony was directed and initiated by the school system, which made it
unconstitutional, rather than by permissive student choice and initiative. With
that in mind, the following guidelines may be of some assistance:
1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to exceed two
minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest within the discretion of the
graduating senior class;
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At a subsequent" school board meeting, a motion was made for a
of silence " substitution for the current policy.30 The motion
failed by a four to three vote, leaving in effect, for the 1993 commencement exercises, Superintendent Zenke's policy which favored student-initiated and student-led prayer. 1 As it turned out, ten of the seventeen
graduating classes in the Duval County School District chose to recite
various religious messages. 2 The remaining classes opted to give
entirely secular messages or no message at all."
amoment

B. ProceduralHistory
Prior to the 1993 graduation exercises, petitioners, a group of
graduating seniors and one parent, brought this action in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida." Asserting
that their rights under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment were violated by Superintendent Zenke's new policy, petitioners
sought to enjoin the Duval County School District from permitting
student-initiated and student-led prayer at graduation."
The Middle District denied petitioners' motion for preliminary
injunctive relief, finding that they failed to sustain their burden of
demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits."
Subsequently, the 1993 graduation ceremonies for the Duval County

2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a student volunteer,
in the graduating senior class, chosen by the graduating senior class as a whole;
3. If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening and/or closing
message, the content of that message shall be prepared by the student volunteer
and shall not be monitored or otherwise reviewed by Duval County School Board,
its officers or employees;
The purpose of these guidelines is to allow the students to direct their own
graduation message without monitoring or review by school officials.
Id.

29. Id. Petitioners asserted that the school beard's primary purpose in creating the
new policy "was to preserve and perpetuate prayer during graduation exercises" as
evidenced by the motion for a "moment of silence." See id. at 451.
30. Id. at 449.
31. Id.
32. Id.

33. Id. at 449-50.
34. Id. at 448.
35. Id.

36. Id. Denial of petitioner's preliminary injunctive relief request was mostly based on
a recent decision by the Fifth Circuit where the court upheld a school resolution, similar
to that of Superintendent Zenke's, which permitted student-initiated invocations and
benedictions that were nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature. Id. See Jones v.
Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1992).
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School District were conducted in accordance with the new policy.37
Thereafter, the case proceeded through discovery and was presented
before the Middle District on the parties' cross motions for summary
m
judgment."
In their motion for summary judgment, petitioners argued that prayer
during graduation is per se unconstitutional, and that the school board
could not avoid responsibility by delegating decision making to the
graduating students.3 9 Respondents, asserting their own First Amendment right of Free Speech,' argued that student-initiated, student-written and student-delivered prayer at graduation is not subject to
official monitoring by the school board or its employees and, therefore,
lacks the pervasive government involvement condemned by the
Establishment Clause. 4 '
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Middle District found no genuine issue of material fact, holding that
respondents were entitled to prevail on the constitutional issues as a
matter of law.42 The Middle District, applying both Lee v. Weisman'
and Lemon v. Kurtzman," denied petitioners' motion for summary
judgment and granted respondents' cross motion.* Accordingly, final
judgment was entered for respondents, allowing student-initiated,
student-written and student-delivered prayer at graduation. 4s
C.

Analysis
Nine years following the holding in Marsh v. Chambers,47 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court in Lee v. Weisman," denied application
of the well-established doctrine of civil religion in the context of

37.

851 F. Supp. at 448.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 450.
40. Id. at 449. Another group of students were granted leave to intervene as
defendants. Defendant-respondents asserted that their right of free speech, pursuant to
the School Board's equal access policy, would be violated upon the School Board's compelled
discrimination of religious speech at graduation. Id.
41. Id. at 450.
42. Id. at 448.
43. 112 S.Ct. 2649.
44. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon is the landmark case in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
45. 851 F. Supp. at 448.
46. Id.
47. 463 U.S. 783. The Court in Marsh upheld the practice of opening legislative
sessions with an invocation given by an ordained minister paid with the public funds.
48. 112 S.Ct. 2649.
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traditional4 graduation exercises."e To permit prayer at graduation,
the Court held, would be to coerce"1 dissenting graduation attendees to
participate in religious exercises."' The Court, though acknowledging
the similarities between legislative invocations and traditional prayer at
graduation,", took great strides in distinguishing Marsh and Lee."
The Court's distinction was grounded in psycho-theory:' That the
"atmosphere" at graduation lent itself to a greater likelihood of coercing
religion upon the attendees; in particular, the graduating seniors."6
The Lee Court, in addition to confusing civil religion with sectarian
religion,57 turned a blind eye to over two hundred years of American
history."8 Common sense and judicial integrity require the application
of history in constitutional analysis."9
Undeniably, therefore, the
intent and impressions of our Founding Fathers must be afforded
49. Id. at 2680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting H. MCKOwN, COMMENCEMENT
ACTMVITIES 56 (1931)). Prayer at graduation has been practiced since the mid 1800s and
is considered to be "as traditional as any other part of the (public school] graduation
program .... " Id.
50. 112 S. Ct. at 2657 ('The suggestion that government may establish an official or
civic religion as a means of avoiding the [Establishment Clause] ... strikes us as a
contradiction that cannot be accepted"). Id. The Court in Lee failed to understand that
civil religion, by its very definition, cannot establish a religion. See supra notes 14-15. See
also Mirsky, supra note 14, at 1254 ("[T]o ignore civil religion's existence would be simply
to blink reality..."). Id.
51. 112 S. Ct. at 2656. The Court, by way of imaginative thinking and creative
penmanship, fashioned the psychologicalcoerciontest, which addresses the "subtle coercive
pressures" inherent in a secondary school environment, where, according to the Lee Court,
the student has no real choice but to participate in the graduation invocation. Id.
52. Id. at 2660-61. Specifically, the Court held, by a five to four vote, that the
Establishment Clause is violated where a public school principal coerces dissenting
graduation attendees to participate in religious exercises by inviting a rabbi to deliver a
nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocation at a middle school graduation ceremony. Id.
53. Id. ("The considerations we have raised in objection to the invocation and
benediction are in many respects similar to the arguments we considered in Marsh.") Id
54. Id. ('The influence and force of a formal exercise in a school graduation are far
greater than the prayer exercise we condoned in Marsh."). Id.
55. See id. at 2684-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting), where Justice Scalia referred to the
Court's psychological coercion test as a "'psycho-journey'... more commonly associated
with interior decorators than with the judiciary," and in comparing interior decorating to
the practice of psychology, he found it to be a "rock-hard science." Id.
56. Id. The Court distinguished the atmosphere of legislative sessions, where adults
are "free to leave," from graduation exercises, where attendees are not, in theory, granted
the same freedom, due to the importance of the event to the student. Id.
57. See supra notes 14-15.
58. 112 S. Ct. at 2659. Justice Kennedy, rather than turning to history for constructive
decision making, pointed to "[rjesearch in psychology" in supporting the Court's holding.
Id.
59. See supra note 2 ("A page of history is worth a volume of logic.").

1995]

FIRST AMENDMENT

1175

considerable weight when analyzing the Constitution.'o Indeed, the
Framers of our Constitution were opposed to the alliance of a single
religion with the sovereign."1 Their concerns date back to the colonial
period, and much earlier, where the sovereign exercised complete control
over the Church, and, in turn, provided the Church its foundation by
compelling attendance and financial support."' By use of the "civil
sword," the sovereign conformed the beliefs of its citizenry to that of the
Church and punished, by death or banishment, the blasphemer or
heretic.'o The "imminent target"' of our Founders, therefore, was the
eradication of this form of government establishment of religion;
sectarian religion, that is, coerced by threat of penalty.'
Although Justice Kennedy's holding in Lee is the law, however
unfortunate, the application of history to the Court's ultimate determination raises'some very fundamental questions: Is graduation prayer the
type of establishment of religion the Framers of our Constitution
Has the Supreme Court gone too far in its
intended to deter?6
Establishment Clause jurisprudence by substituting sound reasoning
based on historical data for imaginative thinking grounded in psycho
babble?" If so, is this the type of boundless decision making that we,
as a constitutionally-based society, wish to encourage by way of passivity
and ignorance? And if so, what then lies ahead in the future?

60. 465 U.S. at 674 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-74 (1926)).
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Congress in 1789 takes on
special significance in light of the Court's emphasis that the First Congress [which
included seventeen draftsmen of the Constitution] "was a Congress whose
constitutional decisions have always been regarded, as they should be regarded,
as of the greatest weight in the interpretation of that fundamental instrument."
See also 463 U.S. at 790 ("[H]istorical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen
intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause
applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress.').
61. But see supra note 13.
62. Adams, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559, 1618 (1989).
63. Id. at 1618-19. See also Fain, Prayerin Public Schools: A Moment of Silence, 15
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 27 (1990), noting that government officials, with aspirations of
political advancement, commonly "tortuded], maimaled] and kill[ed]' blasphemers and
heretics. Id.
64. Fain, supra note 63, at 27.
65. Adams, supra note 62, at 1620. "The essence of an establishment [of a religion is]
governmental coercion of conscience," by use of the "civil sword." Id.
66. 465 U.S. at 678 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 1411 (1970)) ("The
real object of the [First] Amendment was ...to prevent any national ecclesiastical
establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national
government."). Id.
67. See supra note 55.
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IV. THE FUTURE
The specific question invoked by the holding in Lee is whether the
Court's interpretive stretch in Establishment Clause jurisprudence will
ultimately lead to the conclusion that student-initiated, student-written
and student-delivered prayer at graduation is unconstitutional. The
answer may depend on which Establishment Clause test controls: The
traditional three-prongtest 8 of Lemon v. Kurtzman or the psychological
coercion test69 created in Lee v. Weisman.7" The remainder of this
article will be devoted to answering the specific question posed by
analyzing the facts of Adler under both Lemon and Lee.
Three-ProngTest
To protect our citizenry from the "three main evils"71 of Establishment Clause intrusion, the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman created the
three-prongtest.7

A.

1. Purpose Prong. The practice of permitting prayer at graduation,
like the opening of court sessions with "God save the United States and
this honorable court," serves "the legitimate secularpurpose of solemnizing [the] occasion, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society."7 While
maintaining its religious significance, the tradition of opening court
sessions with reference to a divine being is so deeply rooted in our

68. 403 U.S. at 612-13. Lemon v. Kurtzman, the landmark case in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, held that in order for the challenged state action to be considered
constitutional, it must: (1) have a secular legislative purpose; (2) have the primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. Id.
69. See supra note 51.
70. The Court has repeatedly stated that there is no clear test in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 614, for example, the Court stated "that
the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier
depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Id. This is further
evidenced by the Court's emphasis of the particular setting in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct.
at 2661 ("Our Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains a delicate and fact-sensitive one
... ."). Id. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668),
in which the Court stated that the Establishment Clause was designed to "state an
objective, not to write a statute"; thus, "no fixed, per se rule can be framed." Id.
71. 403 U.S. at 612. The three evils addressed in Lemon are "sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Id.
72. See supra note 68.
73. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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national customs that it assumes a secular purpose.7 4 This applies
equally to the long-standing tradition of opening graduation exercises
with an invocation.7"

High school graduation is a moment to be cherished, arriving only
once in a lifetime. Mothers, fathers, siblings, grandparents, distant
relatives and close friends are brought together to witness and celebrate
this momentous occasion.7" Thus, by opening the graduation ceremony
with a student-elected message, whether religious or not, serves the

legitimate secular purpose of solemnizing the moment."

Further, "[a]

meaningful graduation ceremony [complete with invocations and
benedictions] can provide encouragement to finish school and the
inspiration and self-assurance necessary to [succeed] after graduation."78 Certainly, providing an incentive to complete high school and
excel in the future serves, at the very least, a legitimate secular

purpose.7

Note, however, that the purpose prong of Lemon is violated where a
state policy, although having a legitimate secular purpose, is primarily
motivated by religious design.s" Thus, the question raised in Adler is
whether the School Board's "actual purpose [in adopting the new
district-wide policy was] to endorse or disapprove of [a particular]

74. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that because of the "history and ubiquity [of such
traditions as our national motto In God We Trust, they] are not understood as conveying
government approval of particular religious beliefs." Id.
75. Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987) ('Phe
annual graduation exercises here are analogous to the legislative and judicial sessions
referred to in Marsh and should be governed by the same principles."). Id. The Sixth
Circuit noted that "civil" (or nonsectarian) prayer has been recognized since the birth of our
Country since it does not "symbolically place the government's official seal of approval on
one religious view." See 463 U.S. at 792.
76. Id.
77. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1992). See also
Griffith v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054, 1059 (D. Kansas 1992).
78. 977 F.2d. at 966. The Fifth Circuit upheld a school resolution, similar to that of
Superintendent Zenke's, which permitted student-initiated invocations and benedictions
that were nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature. Id.
79. Id.
80. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824,830 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41) (While having a historical secular purpose, the posting of the
Ten Commandments in a classroom violates the Establishment Clause since the
"pre-eminent purpose [of the state is to promote Christianity which is] plainly religious in
nature."). Id.
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religion.""1 Actual purpose may be determined by reviewing the plain
language, legislative history and application of the policy in question. 2
There is no indication, based on the plain language of the policy,"
that the School Board intended to "endorse or disapprove of [a particular] religion."' Instead, the policy which permits, without any administrative guidance, student-initiated, student-written and student-delivered prayer at graduation, is clearly neutral. The subsequent
application of the new district-wide policy further supports the School
Board's position of neutrality. This is evidenced by the fact that seven
of the seventeen graduating classes opted, and were allowed, to give
entirely secular messages or no message at all, while the remaining
classes chose to recite various religious messages.' The "moment of
silence" motion, asserted by petitioners as evidence of religious design
M is easily reconciled by the fact that
on the part of the School Board,"
a majority of the Board voted for the current, more neutral, policy 7
Upon this evidence, it becomes plainly clear that the School Board did
not intend to "endorse or disapprove of [a particular] religion.'
Instead, it appears that their motivations were the exact opposite; to
permit the graduating seniors to chose, wholly on their own, whether or
not to celebrate their commencement exercises with a brief religious
message.
2. Effect Prong. The practice of permitting prayer at graduation,
like the opening of legislative sessions with an invocation, has the
primaryeffect "of solemnizing [the] occasion, expressing confidence in the

81. Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,56 (1985)). The Eleventh Circuit found
that, although a secular purpose existed in having pregame prayer, the "pre-eminent"
purpose of the School District was to *express support for Protestant Christianity" as stated

in the record. Id.
82. 851 F. Supp. at 451 (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-68;
Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 8, 23; Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater,
2 F.3d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1993)).
83. See supra note 28.
84. See supra note 81.

85. See supra notes 32-33. See also 851 F. Supp. at 454 (Due to the long-standing
tradition of having invocations and benedictions at graduation, it is not surprising that ten
of the high schools in the Duval County School District chose to continue that tradition.).
Id.

86. See supra note 29.
87. 851 F. Supp. at 451 ("The individual, and quite possibly varied, purposes or
intentions of the several operative decision makers, especially when those views are known
only with respect to less than a majority of those voting or deciding, would have little or
no probative value."). Id,
88. See supra note 81.
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future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation
insociety.' m Where the School Board merely permits student-initiated,
student-written and student-delivered prayer at graduation, it is
understood by the graduation attendees that the chosen message is
neither endorsed nor disapproved of by the,state.tm Clearly, there can
be no perceived endorsement of a particular religion by the state where
the School Board provides the graduating seniors with the sole discretion
to determine the type and manner of the message, if any, to be delivered
at graduation."
The likelihood of the School Board's policy having the primary effect
of "communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval
of religion' is further diminished because of the relative age and
maturity of graduating seniors who, because of their stature, are less
likely to be influenced by religious messages than their younger, more
impressionable peers.9' The impressionability and susceptibility of
adolescent school children is firmly established in law." The heightened scrutiny afforded to adolescents, however, should not apply to
graduating seniors, who, upon completion of high school, enter the realm
of adulthood.'5
89. 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id,at 692 (The crucial question under the effect prong is whether the state action
or policy has the primary effect of "communicating a message of government endorsement
or disapproval of religion."). Id.
91. 851 F. Supp. at 454 (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987)) ("To have forbidden 'effects'
under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion
through its own activities and influence."). Id.
92. See supra note 90.
93. 794 F. Supp. at 1057 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 264) ("It is the 'undue
influence' on a captive audience composed of young, developing, and susceptible minds that
has prompted the Supreme Court to give special scrutiny to religious influences in the
elementary and secondary public schools."). Id. See also Albright v. Board of Educ. of
Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F. Supp. 682, 691 (C.D. Utah 1991) (citing 454 U.S. at 274) ("It
should be recognized that high school students are not 'babes in arms' and that in fact they
are mature enough to understand that a school does not endorse or promote a religion by
permitting prayer [at graduation.). Id.
94. See supra 92-93. See also 977 F.2d at 970 (citing 112 S. Ct. at 2658) where the
Court failed to reconcile its "previous recognition that graduating seniors 'are less
impressionable than younger students'" by holding that age is not a factor in determining
whether state-mandated prayer at graduation is unconstitutionally coercive. Id.
95. 794 F. Supp. at 1057 (quoting Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., [Jones I] 930
F.2d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 1991)) ("e graduation ceremony lies on the threshold of high
school students' transitions into adulthood, when religious sensibilities hardly constitute
impressionable blank slates."). Id. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 274. That this
transition into adulthood often includes attending college; and that college students are
considered less impressionable than adolescent students. Id. See also Board of Educ. v.
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This realm, however-grand it may seem at the time, nevertheless,
carries with it some harsh realities. Those walls which at one time were
erected to shield the graduates as children suddenly collapse, exposing
them to a reality -never before known nor imagined. Now these
graduates, many of whom are eighteen, must chose the direction of their
lives. Is it reasonable, therefore, to require that these adults receive the
same protection as our adolescent school children? The answer, indeed,
should be no."
The likelihood that student-initiated and student-delivered prayer at
graduation conveys a message of government endorsement of a
particular religion is even further reduced by'the relaxed atmosphere of
the graduation setting as compared to the strictures of the classroom
setting.97 The Court,' today, becomes immediately distrustful upon
discovery of religious instruction in the classroom." Because of a
child's inherent "emulation of teachers as role models," the concern is
that this special student-teacher relationship will likely result in the
indoctrination of religion; in particular, that of the teacher." Upon
completion of high school, however, this special relationship ends,
marking a time of transition from childhood to adulthood and notably
reducing the likelihood of religious indoctrination." °° Thus, the
heightened scrutiny required of the Court in the classroom setting is no
longer necessary.
Additionally, the graduating seniors and their younger family
members, as distinguished from the classroom setting, are accompanied
by their parents at graduation, which, by their mere presence, act as a
"buffer" against any religious influences that might arise.1"' Equally
important is the fact that graduation attendance is voluntary as
compared to the classroom setting where attendance is enforced by

Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). That "particularly in this age of massive media
information... the,., difference in age between high school [seniors] and college students
does not justify departing from Widmar." Id.
96. See supra note 95.

97. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985). ("The symbolism of a
union between church and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose
experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment as
much as free and voluntary choice."). Id. (emphasis added).
98. 496 U.S. 226, 251 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 584).
99. Id.

100. See supra note 95. See also 822 F.2d at 1409 ("IT]he graduation context does not
implicate the special nature of the teacher-student relationship--a relationship that focuses
on the transmission of knowledge and values by an authority figure."). Id.
101. 822 F.2d at 1409. See also 794 F. Supp. at 1057 (The accompaniment of parents
is "expected to mitigate any 'coercive power' that might otherwise be present."). Id.
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threat of penalty.'
Furthermore, graduation, unlike class, is a
special, once in a lifetime, highly celebrated occasion. 103
Petitioners argue, nevertheless, that any reference to a divine being
at a school sponsored event inescapably results in an unconstitutional
establishment of religion by the state. 4 .This argument should fail
because it assumes that there is no difference between a graduation
ceremony and the classroom setting. Granted, the two settings are
similar, 5 but they are not by any stretch of the imagination the same.
Indeed, graduation prayer is more analogous to the opening of legislative
sessions with an invocation, than say, for example, beginning class with
a reading from the Bible.'O'
3. Entanglement Prong. By delegating its authority to the
graduating class, the Duval County School Board retained its neutrality
and was not, therefore, excessively entangled with religion.0 7 The
facts in Adler are nothing like the continuous and comprehensive state
surveillance present in Lemon.'
In contrast, the School Board's
policy requires no administrativeor faculty monitoring of the student-elected, graduation message.'
In fact, the School Board commands
administrative neutrality, which is evidenced by the policy-setting
memorandum which provides, in part, that the student-elected message
"shall not be monitored or otherwise reviewed by the Duval County
School Board, its officers or employees.""0

102. See supra note 93. See also 822 F.2d at 1409 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 107
S. Ct. at 2577) ("The State exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory
attendance requirements."). Id.
103. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. See supra note 39.
105. 112 S. Ct. at 2660. But see note 94.
106. See supra note 75. See also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 792 (quoting Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)) where the Court distinguished between "adults]
... not readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination,'" and children who are. Id.
107. See 977 F.2d at 967-68. The Fifth Circuit found that even where the policy
requires review of the graduation message there is no excessive entanglement with religion
on the part of the state. Id. See also 794 F. Supp. at 1059.
108. 465 U.S. at 684 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619-22). The types of
"state surveillance" and "enduring entanglement" that concerned the Court included, for
example, the government's examination of school records to compare the amount of
expenditures attributable to secular and religious education. Id.
109. See 862 F.2d at 831. The Eleventh Circuit found that there is no entanglement
with religion where the School District does not "monitor" the content of the message nor
choose the deliverer of the pregame prayer. Id,
110. See supra note 28.
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4. Free Speech. Interestingly, the facts in Adler invoke an equally
fundamental First Amendment right; specifically, the right of Free
Speech."1 The right of Free Speech is implicated where the state,
pursuant to its policy, creates a public forum."2 Generally, a public
forum is created where the, state deliberately provides the community
Once
with a forum, open to indiscriminate speech and expression."1
a public forum is effectuated, the Free Speech Clause is triggered, and
the state cannot exclude speech without first proving the existence of a
compelling interest."' This fundamental principle applies equally to
religious speech which "enjoys sanctuary within the First, Amendment. 116
Indeed, a claim of religious establishment by the state may be
To hold, however, that the
considered compelling -in this context.'
Establishment Clause is violated in a true public forum, would be
paradoxical, since, in order for the state to create such a forum, it must
not convey a message of government endorsement of a particular
religion."1" In other words, a true public forum cannot, by its very

111. See supra note 3940.
112. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 267; Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226;
Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383. See also Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108,
1120 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Hazelwood Sch; Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,267 (1988))
(Referring specifically to commencement exercises, the Third Circuit found that "school
facilities may become public forums if by policy or by practice' school officials have opened
those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by... some segment of the public, such as student
organizations.'"). Id. The court went on to say that a public forum may be created at
graduation where students are authorized to decide the topic and speaker of the message.
Id.
113. 454 U.S. at 273. The Court held that a university, having "opened its facilities for
[indiscriminate] use by student groups;" created a public forum and therefore, "[could not]
now exclude groups because of the content of their speech." Id.
114. Id. at 270.
115. 5 F.3d at 1387. See also 454 U.S. at 269 (citing Heffron v. International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 452 U.S.,640 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558- (1948)) ("[Rleligious worship... [is the] form of
speech and association protected by the First Amendment."). Id
116. 454 U.S. at 271 ("We agree that the interest of the [state] in complying with [the
Establishment Clause] may be characterized as compelling."). Id.
117. Id. at 274. See also 5 F.3d at 1393 ("The analysis that courts must bring to bear
on the interplay between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause in the
public forum context is somewhat curious in that the existence of[a] public forum initially
implicates the Free Speech issue and ultimately determines the Establishment Clause
issue."); Id.; 496 U.S. at 250 ("[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."); Id.; 5 F.3d at 1392
(quoting Americans United For Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980
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definition, exist where a particular religion is established by the
state.11
The Middle District in Adler found that a true public forum is created
where the state permits indiscriminate, student-initiated, student-written and student-delivered prayer at graduation. 1 9 Indeed, the Duval
County School Board's policy is one of neutrality rather than endorsement.12 0 If, in fact, the School Board were to deny religious speech in
this context, it would display hostility, rather than neutrality, towards
religion. 121 Such discrimination, even in the interest of Establishment
Clause, though mistaken, would be completely contrary to, and therefore
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of
unconstitutional, under
1 22
the First Amendment.
Thus, because of the new open-forum policy, the Duval County School
Board has a legitimate secular purpose of, in addition to solemnizing the
occasion, permitting, without discrimination, all forms of speech at
This includes, unequivocally, religious speech."12
graduation."
Furthermore, by permitting student-initiated and student-led prayer at
125
graduation, the School Board avoids entanglement with religion.

F.2d 1538, 1553 (6th Cir. 1992)) ("[T]ruly private religious expression in a truly public
forum cannot be seen as [an] endorsement [of a particular religion]."); Id.; 5 F.3d at 1394
(citing Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 629 (7th Cir.1992) ("Any perceived endorsement of
religion in a true public forum is simply misperception; the Establishment Clause is not
in fact violated."); Id.
118. 496 U.S. at 250-52. To illustrate the relationship between establishment and free
speech, consider the Court's holding in Mergens. There the Court found that a message
of endorsement of a particular religion was not conveyed where the state permitted a
student-initiated and student-led, Christian club, to meet with other clubs after school
hours. The Court, in addition, made it a point to say, "[wle think that secondary school
students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse
or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis." Id.
119. 851 F. Supp. at 454. The Middle District also noted that graduation exercises,
traditionally, are held off campus, which further supports the holding that the School
Board's policy did not convey a message of endorsement of a particular religion.
120. 496 U.S. at 248. See also 5 F.3d at 1391 n.11 ('he endorsement test [is based on
the perceptions of a reasonable observer rather than] the ill-informed ...who simply view
[the] religious [speech]... without regard to [the existence of a] public forum."); Id.; 5 F.3d
at 1394 (citing Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 629 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Religious speech may not
be excluded from [a] public forum just because [a] passerby misunderstands the public
role."). Id.
121. 496 U.S. at 248.
122. 454 U.S. at 267-68.
123. See 454 U.S. at 272; 496 U.S. at 248; 5 F.3d at 1389; 851 F. Supp. at 453.
124. See supra note 115. See also 851 F. Supp. at 454 (quoting Americans United, 980
F.2d at 1543) ("A policy of treating religious speech the same as all other speech certainly
serves a secular purpose.").
125. See 454 U.S. at 272; 496 U.S. at 248; 5 F.3d at 1389.
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Indeed, the School Board "would risk greater 'entanglement' by
attempting to [exclude] 'religious speech' [at the commencement
exercises]."l"
B. Psychological Coercion Test
The inquiry with respect to psychologicalcoercion is whether the state
directs a religiousexercise in such a manner as to oblige the participation
of dissenters."' The Court, in Lee v. Weisman, answered this question
in the affirmative. 2 Specifically, the Court held as unconstitutional
state directed prayer, delivered by a rabbi, at a middle school graduation
ceremony."29 Note, however, that Justice Kennedy, writing the opinion
in Lee, emphasized the "dominant facts [which] mark[ed] and control[led]
the confines of [the Court's] decision." 30
Particularly troubling to the Court was the fact that a school official,
pursuant to state policy, mandated prayer at graduation and, in
Graduaaddition, chose the speaker and message to be delivered.'
tion prayer in this context, the Court in Lee held, effectively coerces,
unconstitutionally, dissenting graduation attendees to participate in
religious exercises. "'
Unlike the facts in Lee, the officials of the Duval County School
District are, pursuant to the new policy, clearly prohibited from
mandating or soliciting prayer at graduation. 83 In fact, the graduating seniors of the Duval County School District are afforded complete

126. 454 U.S. at 272. See also 496 U.S. at 248 ("[A] denial of equal access to religious
speech might well create greater entanglement problems in the form ofinvasive monitoring
to prevent religious speech at meetings at which such speech might occur."). Id.
127. Jones, 977 F.2d at 970. See also Mergens, 496 U.S. at 261 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("The inquiry with respect to coercion [is] whether the government imposes
pressure upon a student to participate in a religious activity."). Id.
128. 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
129. Id.
130. The narrowness of the Lee Court's holding is evidenced from such statements as,
"olur Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains a delicate and fact-sensitive one...,"
112 S. Ct. at 2661; "[tlhe degree of school involvement here made it clear that the
graduation prayers bore the imprint of the State...." 977 F.2d at 970 (quoting 112 S. Ct.
at 2658); "[tjhe state-imposed character of an invocation and benediction by clergy selected
by the school combine to make the prayer a state-sanctioned religious exercise...." 977
F.2d at 970 (quoting 112 S. Ct. at 2661).
131. 977 F.2d at 970 (citing 112 S. Ct. at 2655-56). The particular concern of the Lee
Court is that graduation prayer in this context "is a choice attributable to the State, and
from a constitutional perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must
occur." id.
132. Id. at 971 (citing 112 S. Ct. at 2658-59).
133. See supra note 28.
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discretion to determine the message, if any, to be delivered at graduation.'
Moreover, the new policy requires that the graduation message, whether religious or not, be prepared and delivered by a student
volunteer, elected by the graduating class as a whole.18 Thus, the
graduating seniors, after participating in the selection of the message,
clearly understand that prayer at graduation, if desired, is neither
endorsed nor disapproved of by the state.18 For that reason, graduation prayer in this context places less psychological pressure on
dissenting students to participate since it is understood that the message
"represent[s] the will of their peers, who are less able to coerce
" 1 7
participation than an authority figure from the state or clergy. 3
The Court in Lee expressed, however, that the advancement of
religious conformity through peer pressure is as strong, if not stronger,
than religious coercion by the state."8 Thus, the Court may find,
based on this idea of subtle peer pressure coercion,'89 that the School
Board's new policy effectively forces religion upon a minority of students
who vote for a different message and fail.
Although there is a certain degree of inequity inherent in subjecting
a minority of students to the views of the majority in this context, the
Court's responsibility to the American public is limited to upholding the
Constitution. However shocking this hard reality may appear to the
minority of students in the Duval County School District, the fact is the
Framers did not intend nor has the Supreme Court found that the
Establishment Clause must shield society from exposure to every
religious force." 4 Instead, the intent of the Framers in drafting the
Establishment Clause was to guard the people from the inherent harms
of government mandated religion, enforced by threat ofpenalty.""
V. CONCLUSION

Simple inquiry can clarify the most complex of issues. Quite often,
unfortunately, legal scholars, by use of colorful language and fine
aphorisms, hide, or miss entirely, the obvious issue. Hiding the ball is
134. Id.

135. Id.
136. 851 F. Supp. at 456 (citing 977 F.2d at 971).
137. Id. (quoting 977 F.2d at 971).
138. 112 S. Ct. at 2659.
139. Id. The Court in Lee was concerned about the peer pressure on attending students
to maintain respectful silence during the graduation invocation.
140. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312 ("The First Amendment... does not say that in every and
all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State... [oitherwise the state and
religion would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly."). Id.
141. See supra notes 63-66.
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common among legal scholars, at least in my experience. Missing the
obvious, as I see it, can be attributed to, as odd as it may seem, too
much scholarly analysis in the legal abstract which, in my opinion, for
whatever its worth, results in a failure to ask the right question.
The plain and simple question here is why? Why in our society do we
attach such great signifance to high school graduation?14 2 By analyzing this question (outside of the legal abstract), the real and obvious
issue will unravel, leaving us with an answer, I'm willing to bet, the
common person already holds.
So again, why? Why is high school graduation so highly celebrated in
our society? The answer is ridiculously obvious. Apparently there's
more to graduation than mere recognition of achievement by the state;
otherwise, a diploma would suffice. 4 Indeed, for the graduates, this
cherishable, once-in-a-lifetime, highly celebrated occasion, is a moment
to be relished and a time to be applauded by family and friends, or
generally, the community, for their efforts and successes.'" And for
the community, graduation is a time to share in the joy, reflect on the
past, and look idealistically to the future.'" Thus, it should not be
surprising to find, in an event held so dear by the graduates and
community, a touch of public ritual--or civil religion.' That is the
case in Adler v. Duval County School District.
"It is of course true that great consequences can grow from small
beginnings, but the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability
and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow." 47 Profoundly stated, the above phrase squarely depicts the fears
and apprehensions of our Supreme Court justices. As the ultimate
interpreters of our Constitution their responsibilities loom large. In
particular, and most importantly, each member of the Supreme Court,
upon taking oath, assumes a role as protector of our freedom and liberty.
Considering the magnitude of this pledge to the American people, a
position of extreme caution and trepidation in interpreting the
Constitution is clearly understandable.
Indeed, the Court in Lee took a similar stand. There Justice Kennedy
cautioned, "what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views
may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce."' The concern on the

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

977 F.2d at 972.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795 (emphasis added).
112 S. Ct. at 2658.
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part of the Court in Lee was that graduation prayer, although nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature, could mark the beginning of the type
of government establishment of religion feared by our Founders. But
how much protection is too much? Phrased another way, at what point
does the Court's Establishment Clause paranoia become hostile towards
religion, thus, violating the equally fundamental rights of Free Exercise
and, in this case, Free Speech?
Naturally, the above inquiry presumes a necessity for constitutional
equilibrium in a truly democratic society. Indeed, our Constitution
requires nothing less. Thus, the Court, as guardian of our freedom, has
an obligation to strike the proper balance between equally fundamental
rights. Applying this doctrine to the facts of Adler v. Duval County
School District, the Court must, in order to obtain constitutional
equality, uphold the School Board policy which permits studentinitiated, student-written and student-delivered prayer at graduation.
Otherwise, wouldn't the Court in ruling differently fail its own standards
for constitutional
adjudication by overlooking the "real threat" for "mere
1 49
shadow"?

149. 463 U.S. at 795.

